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The BAROMETER is a student weekly newspaper for the exchange of ideas and 
information concerning the development and improvement of the professional 
environment at the Naval Postgraduate School. Items of interest, papers, 
and articles of interest to the students, staff, and faculty as a whole 
are solicited. 
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"We still have, in most ships, the same system of data recording, 
propulsion control, ship control, lookouts, signalling, etc. that 
have been in existence since John Paul Jones." Quote from Feature 
Article. 
EDITORIAL COMMENT: A 100-gun, first rate, ship-of-the-line of Nelson's time carried a crew 
of between 800 and 1000 men in a hull less than 200 feet long. In 1m€!.,. early par~ E;f this 
century five-masted full-rigged ships such as the 480 foot PREUSSEN Fs~ile~round"T&e.Horn" 
with a crew of 48. A modern tanker or freighter plys the waters of~he wOtld with fewer 
men than this, but larger crews of smaller Naval ships of the world are sandwiched between 
the machinery and electronics compartments of the ships they "sail",-~in_. Vjce Admiral Frank 
H. Price, Jr., Chairman of the Navy's Ships Characteristics Board ~~~~ph~!!man of the 
Ship Acquisition and Improvement Council discusses some aspects of ~Qucing the complement 
of the Navy's new ships in the feature for this issue. f II~ 
FEATURE: EFFICIENT MANPOWER UTILIZATION THROUGH SHIPBOARD AUTOMATION, INTEGRATION AND GOOD 
SHIP DESIGN 
"Utilization of manpower is one of the most critical problems facing the Navy today. I 
would like to discuss briefly some of the aspects of this subject that we are wrestling with. 
They concern shipboard automation, integration and efficient ship design. 
Our ships have traditionally been manned to be able to perform essentially all functions 
simultaneously. The old reaction, 'When in doubt, put another man on it,' stems from the 
day of sail and from the hand serve gun era when the personnel required for total manning 
of these labor intensive systems in time of need provided a considerable reserve of available 
manpower for a myriad of shipboard tasks. Since the manpower was already there and our 
systems were relatively simple and essentially independent, there was little need to strive 
for efficient manpower utilization. Many of these concepts have, unfortunately, carried 
over and are present in the Navy today. We must change our thinking if we are to continue 
to have an effective Navy in the future a Navy capable of properly serving our country's 
interests. 
There are a number of factors which have a significant impact on the modernization of 
our current forces and on the ships that we are designing and building: 
First, modern technology has greatly increased the scope and complexity of naval warfare. 
We can no longer handle many of the problems and threats by adding more men with grease 
pencils. Many areas can no longer be treated as independent entities, and there is an ever 
driving force to provide more costly and complex systems and equipments requiring increased 
personnel skills. Automation and integration of functions has become mandatory in many 
areas in order to combat effectively the increasing threat spectrum. 
Second, manpower is become more costly in salaries, training and benefits. The ALL 
VOLUNTEER FORCE CONCEPT will require increased concern for our men; how long we leave them 
at sea, the conditions under which they live and work, and we will have to provide better 
habitability, facilities and equipment, all of which costs money. 
Each man that we put in a new destroyer size ship today costs us about five tons plus 
500 cubic feet of ship and 25 thousand dollars of ship construction funds, as well as the 
funds required to maintain that 5 tons and 500 cubic feet of ship for thirty years. Also, 
each man costs us from about ten to fifteen thousand dollars a year in direct costs for his 
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salary and normal benefits, the amount depending on his pay grade, experience, training and 
other variables. BUT THAT ISN'T THE FULL COST. The heating, lighting, and routine consum-
able supplies that support his existence are hidden in the OPERATING BUDGET. Construction 
costs for housing, schools and recreational facilities are in the MILITARY CONSTRUCTION 
BUDGET. 
The cost of a man doesn't end when he is discharged, either. Although not an item in 
the Navy Budget, Veterans Benefits and retirement pay are a part of the total burden. 
While the Navy is a heavily material oriented Service, as contrasted with the Army and 
Marine Corps which are personnel intensive, about 42 percent of our OPERATING BUDGET and 
26% of our total budget are devoted to personnel. 
I think you can see, from the dollars and cents viewpoint, why the Chief of Naval 
Operations is vitally interested in the success of the automation and other programs which 
have been initiated to reduce the need for people while still maintaining the effectiveness 
of the Fleet. 
Third, we are facing a period of essentially level or decreasing defense budgets at a 
time when we' must undertake a large scale Fleet modernization. Thus, being able to procure 
significant numbers of new ships is vitally important, and we cannot look to having the 
best in every hull. We must tailor our ships to their mission. Those whose mission requires 
it should have the best in men and equipment. The factors applicable to one mission are not 
necessarily applicable to another. Thus ships need not be manned and equipped to handle all 
conceivable missions, and the degree of sophistication and automation necessary or desirable 
will vary from one ship type to another. 
We must carefully analyze and evaluate each ship's requirements and provide only what is 
needed-better has always been the enemy of good enough. 
If we are to increase the effectiveness of our manpower, we have to have an understanding 
of the total problem. Our tendency too frequently is to look at one factor in isolation. 
Such practice often results in overstated and unrealistic programs which are impossible of 
accomplishment. Our need for viable programs to increase the effectiveness of our scarce 
manpower is too great to allow this to happen. 
Let us take shipboard automation and integration. These terms have different meanings 
to different people. A WEAPONS SYSTEM DESIGNER will look at automation in the light of 
increased effectiveness. If a radar data handling system is automated, we can keep track 
of more targets, provide more data on course and speed, and do it all in so called real 
time. The COMBAT SYSTEM ENGINEER will look at it to provide the automatic integration of 
various systems so that we can more effectively combat several threats simultaneously or 
react more rapidly to a greater variety of situations. A PROPULSION ENGINEER will coasiaer 
those factors which lead to more efficient operation of the ship's propulsion plant-and, 
THE LIST GOES ON. 
With todj~s technology, almost any degree of automation or integration is possible, and 
the dedicated engineer often becomes enamoured with developing the most complex system 
possible. Unfortunately, such an approach often gives rise to more problems than it solyes. 
Systems can become so complicated that we breed unreliability and the skill levels of 
personnel, both operating and maintenance, are raised to the point that they cannot be met 
in any realistic manner. Thus, we can reduce our capability and effectiveness by our very 
efforts to improve it. 
While we always say, and believe, that we save people when we undertake any shipboard 
automation program, the result is not always achieved. When we have the capability to 
track more targets, we often put more people in the loop to process and evaluate the 
added available information. Since our automated systems often have less than desired 
reliability, we have to provide more maintenance personnel to make them work. Or, we have C) 
often tried to alleviate the situation by developing highly complext test equipment which 
in itself poses more problems. The number of men required to man our ships seldom decreases, 
and generally we are looking for space to put in more bunks and ships are always after more 
and more men. 
Thus, our past efforts have not always been successful and we have often tended to 'f 
'complex ourselves out of business'. On the other side of the coin, we have tended to 
ignore the benefits of automation in many fruitful areas. We still have, in most ships, 
the same system of data recording, propulsion control, ship control, lookouts, signaling, 
etc. that have been in existence since JOHN PAUL JONES. Our seagoing people have tended to' 
resist change in many traditional areas and we have lacked well structured development 
programs which would overcome these built in traditional biases. 
Our current effort to develop a viable program for shipboard automation has stemmed from 
two separate endeavors. One endeavor resulted from our new ship formulation efforts where, 
under level budget constraints, we have undertaken to design to cost in order to get the 
most out of our ship acquisition dollars. Designing to cost has forced attention on manning 
reduction as one area where some gains must be made, and this in turn has led us to look to 
automation as one solution. 
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The second endeavor stemmed from our ship improvement efforts. We have reached the 
point in most classes of ships where we cannot find room for additional men. Thus, when 
we want to add a new system or capability, such as LAMPS or ASMD, we have come up against 
a crunch, and have been forced to look at ways to reduce manning by automating existing ship 
functions. Also, the number of men we can provide and their cost provide additional incent-
ive for reduction. 
These two efforts are obviously closely related. Had we been more foresighted, we could 
have had automated systems available for our new ships, with the attendent cost and program 
risk reduction, and have been able to ease our personnel problems in existing ships of the 
Fleet. In the last year, since this overall area has been assigned to my office, we have 
been trying to pull these efforts together. Being behind the power curve has complicated 
things, and we have more or less continued with the two efforts in parallel. 
As an example of the new ship design problem, the PF was one of our earliest 'Design to 
Cost' efforts. The reduction of personnel was used as a primary tool in this effort and it 
was handled in several ways. 
In defining the mission of the ship, we consciously limited requirements to those needed 
to do the job. Weapons systems and equipment were selected with an eye to minimum personnel 
requirements. Some of the systems selected did not provide the absolute maximum capability, 
but they effectively met mission requirements, required fewer people for operations and 
maintenance, and were reliable, state-of-the-art systems. 
The mode of integration of these systems was also considered. Which ones needed to be 
integrated or automated in order to meet the threat and the ships mission and which ones did 
not, and where could automation and integration save men. The result was a missile and gun 
system. This type of analysis was applied not only to the combat systems, but also the 
propulsion system. Gas turbines were selected for their responsiveness and flexibility as 
well as their lower manpower requirements. The turbines are directly controlled from the 
bridge with only two below deck watch standers who also control, through automated systems, 
the operation of auxiliaries. 
Another major area of consideration was the design of the basic ship itself. To reduce 
facilities maintenance and other related personnel requirements, the use of low maintenance 
materials was stressed. Automation of all food preparation with utilization of a single 
galley to serve officers, chief petty and officers and the crew; combining all administrative 
functions in a central office complex; place the engines farther aft than has been the 
practice thus enabling central location of berthing areas with consequent reduced water 
and sewage piping runs; all of these contributed to reduced manpower requirements and 
reduced total ship costs. The ship's maintenance philosophy was also considered. This 
included some automated condition monitoring, and component replacement using a rotatable 
pool of shore-repaired components rather than repair on board. There is, incidentally, 
room for much progress in the condition monitoring area. 
On the bridge of the PF we have shifted from the JOHN PAUL JONES concepts of most of 
our ships to an automated console that can be operated by one man, with only three men being 
required on the bridge. 
As a result, partly through automation, and partly through other actions, the PF-some-
what analogous to the 10 year earlier DE 1052 Class-carrying an added helicopter and a sur-
face to air missile system but with a less elaborate ASW detection suit, and using gas 
turbines rather than steam, will be about a thousand tons lighter and carry about 175 men 
rather than 270 of the 1052 Class ship. 
In looking at the situation as a whole, we have had to be careful that we did not overdo 
shipboard automation. A Foreign Government recently designed a similar ship which was very 
heavily automated. They found, however, that they had overdone it. In meeting the needs 
of the resultant complexity . they actually needed more people and ships acquisition costs 
had become exhorbitant. They had to go back and re-design-to trim things down somewhat. 
Since we did not have a good background in many areas of automation, we have been careful 
not to overdo it. It has been difficult to break ground, and we have been in essence 
exploring new territory. Had there been a good development program in the past, we would 
have been able to proceed with more assurance and quite possibly have made a better and 
less expensive ship. 
At the same time the PF design was underway and partly as a result of this work, other 
steps were being instituted to attack the manpower reduction problem on existing Navy ships. 
The bridge has been a fairly easy, understandable 
package to -tackle. We are by no means finished with it, and we could profit by well devised 
automation schemes which are well within the state-of-the-art. Our new ship programs-the 
PHM, PF, Sea Control Ship, and later ship programs-will have bridges which can benefit from 
results of such an effort. 
The propulsion plants of our existing ships are another area where we are looking for 
marked progress. Efforts aimed at the reduction of watchstander requirements in conventional 
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steam plants are sorely needed. Several of our more recent auxiliaries have steam plants 
which have been automated to a large degree. While military considerations may deter us 
from going to completely unmanned engine rooms, as has become the practice in the Merchant 
Service, the generous manning levels of the past can no longer be accepted. Just what the 
best course of action will be in existing steam powered ships is the subject of investigation 
now, and we have high hopes of seeing a prototype automated DE-I052 installation go to sea 
for evaluation. If the price is right, considering the installation costs, the remaining 
lifetime of the ships, the operating and maintenance costs, and the hard personnel savings, 
and provided that the evaluation at sea works well, we may well backfit such a system into 
some classes of existing Fleet ships. 
As I have stated, a wide-open area for investigation and one which is potentially very 
fruitful is that related to maintenance. A large fraction of the people carried in present 
day ships are there primarily for maintenance purposes. In doing some personnel utilization 
studies, we found that on a DDG-2 Class ship, if all of the watchstanding requirements 
were eliminated, about 150 men would still be required just to perform the required main-
tenance tasks. Approximately half of the PF crew is there for maintenance reasons. Only 
90 men are required for General Quarters and just about 23 for each of the three sections 
of wartime steaming condition watches. The other men are there to maintain the ship and 
its equipment. 
A number of new approaches to maintenance are being introduced-modular replacement of 
components; shore overhaul of major equipments on a periodic basis possibly based on 
condition monitoring; introduction of new materials; use of built in or automated test 
equipment; use of life cycle cost considerations in selecting equipment; and many others. 
There is much yet to be done in this area, however, before we will have exhausted the 
possibilities. Also we need better coatings, corrosion resistant materials, reliable long 
lived pumps, motors and valves. We need answers on how much preventive maintenance is 
enough or how much is too much. We need means of failure prediction. What are optimum 
repair or overhaul frequencies? Is shore-side repair of components really cost effective 
when all of the hidden costs are considered? What are optimum maintenance strategies? How 
much 'insurance' back up should we have, particularly under battle conditions? 
It is this kind of innovative thinking that we are looking for. We need fresh, unbiased 
looks at any and all aspects of our ships and their operations. There will be technological 
developments that can help us out. There will be forests that we don't see because of all 
of the trees that get in our way. Automation and integration are favorite 'buzz' words 
these days, and sometimes credited with being a cure-all for any task which is presently 
being done by people. There are many tasks which not only can be done by machines, but 
they probably can do them better-auto-pilots steer straighter courses, and incidentally 
also increase fuel economy; data loggers are more accurate and can be programmed to 
recognize out of tolerance readings more reliabily than messengers; calculation of navigation-
al and tactical maneuvering problems can be done more quickly and accurately than by radar-
men or quartermasters. 
We must be very careful, however, not to let the experts get carried away with solving 
all of our problems in one big master central computer so that one minor failure can throw 
the whole ship irretrievably into chaos, particularly under battle conditions. The systems 
we select, as I indicated earlier, need to save us money as well as get the job done in 
proper fashion. The most desirable means of achieving a reduction in our manning require-
ments is through the outright elimination of duties, functions, equipment, maintenance or 
other requirements. A second approach is through replacing the man with a machine, provided 
that the machine isn't going to cost more or take more and smarter people to maintain it 
than it eliminated. 
In summary, efficient manpower utilization through shipboard automation, integration 
and good ship design is a very important factor, and it urgently needs development and ~ 
support. The CNO is vitally interested in the overall program because it is so enmeshed 
in the future of the Navy. Much more has to be done, and many factors impinge on solutions. 
In tackling any aspect of the problem, we must remember that 'better is the enemy of good 
enough', and we must not foreget the very basic requirements for reliability and maintain-
ability, training, life cycle costs and so forth. It is important that we realize just 
how much is enough." 
NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL, FEBRUARY 1974 
EDITORIAL: This issue marks the final issue for this quarter. Some of our readers will 
be departing the Naval Postgraduate School equipped, hopefully with some valuable know-
ledge and tools needed in our military services. To them we wish fair weather, smooth 
seas, and following winds. We especially wish to bid farewell and thanks to LCDR Bob 
BRANCO, the previous Editor of The BAROMETER, who rescued it from oblivion. He brought 
us all pertinent and interesting articles which otherwise may have been missed by those 
of us with little time to peruse the professional magazines and journals in which they 
appeared. To the rest of our readers, drive carefully, get rested and recuperated, and 
continue reading The BAROMETER next quarter. 
